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ESSAY:  THE IMPACT OF “GOING PRIVATE” ON CORPORATE STAKEHOLDERS
Kent Greenfield1
 As capital markets in the United States increasingly “go private,” there are a number of 
implications of this trend that have yet to be decisively analyzed.  It is unclear how the retreat of 
companies from public capital markets will affect corporate governance, business 
competitiveness, and public oversight.  It is also unclear how the privatization of corporate 
finance will affect non-shareholder stakeholders of firms, most centrally employees, 
communities, and the environment.
 Some scholars and public policy experts believe that concern for such stakeholders 
should not hold any relevance in the discussion of corporate law in general, and thus may be 
presumed to believe the same about a conversation about privatization.2   In such a view, these 
concerns lie outside the realm of corporate governance law; they therefore should be of no great 
moment in the debate over whether public policy should respond to the strong “going private” 
trend.  But for those of us corporate law scholars who assume that corporate governance should 
1
1 Law Professor & Law Fund Research Scholar, Boston College Law School.  The author thanks Zack Kurland and 
Greg Nannery for excellent research assistance.
2 See, e.g., Hansmann, H., Kraakman R.H., The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 442 (Jan. 
2001) (Arguing that the most efficacious legal mechanisms for protecting the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies lie outside of corporate law); see George W. Dent, Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production 
and Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance 25 (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Paper 
07-21, 2007) (advocating “shareholder primacy” as the best way to protect non-equity stakeholders and promote 
social responsibility), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=995186. 
be analyzed in part according to its impacts on a broad range of stakeholders, one cannot decide 
how to respond to privatization without knowing how it affects those stakeholders.3
 I suggest that, at least at a level of abstraction and as a matter of theory, there is little 
reason to be particularly skeptical of private companies, as compared to public companies, in 
their treatment of stakeholder interests.  Private companies may be good citizens or bad citizens, 
good employers or bad employers.  But this will be determined by what happens in the 
governance and behaviors of particular companies, not by some theoretical predisposition.  This 
essay is intended to be a brief introduction to several of the factors that weigh into the public/
private comparison.
I. TWO CONVENTIONAL WISDOMS
 Conventional wisdom regarding the going private phenomenon holds that it creates 
negative effects for non-shareholder stakeholders.  Such a result occurs because the surge in 
going private transactions is part and parcel of the gladiatorial culture of Wall Street,4 where 
2
3 See Silvia Ayuso, Miguel Angel Ariño, Roberto Garcia Castro & Miguel A. Rodriguez, Maximizing Stakeholders' 
Interests: An Empirical Analysis of the Approach to Corporate Governance (IESE Business School Working Paper, 
Paper No. 670, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982325; David K. Millon, The Ambiguous Significance 
of Corporate Personhood (Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 01–6, 
2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=264141; David K. Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A 
Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 (2000); David K. Millon, 
Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical 
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992); Marleen A. O'Connor, 
Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 
69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to 
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993).
4 Compare www.wallstreetgladiator.com, which expressly draws on this symbolism.  
financial elites buy and sell entire companies for the gain of a tiny minority.5  Little concern is 
paid to anyone or anything other than the financial gain of those elites.  Privatization firms buy 
up companies and take them out of the public markets, allowing them to be shielded from public 
scrutiny while they disembowel the company of its assets.6  The surge of privatization is 
reflective of a money culture that disregards interests of anyone or anything that cannot be 
translated into financial benefit to the firm.  These include environmental conscientiousness,7 
fairness to employees,8 and democratic norms of accountability.9
 This conventional wisdom was echoed most recently by Republican presidential 
candidate Mike Huckabee, who commented on fellow candidate Mitt Romney’s experience in 
private equity, saying, “[I believe] most Americans want their next president to remind them of 
the guy they work with, not the guy who laid them off.”10  In Europe, too, privatization is often 
the target of political leaders.  Speaking about hedge funds and private equity groups in April 
2005, Franz Müntefering, then chairman of the German Social Democratic Party and soon to be 
3
5 Dale A. Oesterle, Are Leveraged Buyouts a Form of Governance Arbitrage?, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 
(forthcoming December, 2008).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Gail Collins, Op-Ed, The Battle of the Mitts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/01/12/opinion/12collins.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (Citing Mike Huckabee’s Campaign Ad running in 
Michigan).
German vice-chancellor, contended that: “Some financial investors don’t waste any thoughts on 
the people whose jobs they destroy.”11
 But there is a competing conventional wisdom, and it directly conflicts with the first one.  
This narrative proposes that the only way to protect companies that want to take a long-term 
view, or that want to take into account interests that do not easily translate to financial income, is 
to privatize the company and insulate it from the short-term pressures of the capital markets.   
The following prominent examples illustrate this competing version of conventional wisdom.
In 1985, Levi Strauss & Co. went through a leveraged buyout (LBO), which was one of 
the largest ever up to that date.12  The LBO took the company out of the public capital markets 
and allowed the descendents of Levi Strauss, the Haas family, to regain control.13  Among the 
reasons given by the family for the LBO was to enable the company to maintain its culture of 
community involvement and its commitment to social responsibility.14  This was more than mere 
lip service.  Soon after the LBO, Levi Strauss & Co. announced uncommonly progressive 
standards for its contractors, and refused to do business in China for over five years to protest 
4
11 Steven J. Davis, et al., Private Equity and Employment 43 (World Econ. Forum, Globalization of Alternative 
Investments, Working Papers Volume I, 2008), available at http://www.weforum.org/df/cgi/pe/Full_Report.pdf. 
12 Buyout Backed at Levi Strauss, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1985, at D11, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9A02EFD81338F932A05754C0A963948260.
13 Id.
14 Id.  See also James Sterngold, Levi Strauss Stock Buyout Would Benefit Small Group, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1996, 
at D2, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9D0DE0D61339F932A15751C0A960958260&sec=&spon=  (discussing Levi’s “growing reputation for social 
responsibility”). 
China’s human rights record.15  The company also divested its pension funds from some 
companies doing business in South Africa, at a time when apartheid still existed.16  The LBO 
occurred because the company believed it had more room to act in a socially responsible way 
toward its multiple stakeholders if it were controlled by the Hass family, who has a long familial 
tradition of philanthropy,17 than by a gross aggregation of public shareholders.  
 Another paradigmatic example of the social benefits of privatization is that of Malden 
Mills, a private apparel company in Massachusetts.  Malden Mills, the manufacturer of Polertec 
fabric, suffered a devastating factory fire just before Christmas in 1995.18  The president and 
principal owner, Aaron Feuerstein, announced after the fire that the company would rebuild the 
factory (even though its competitors were moving off-shore) and maintain payroll in the 
meantime.19  He paid Christmas bonuses even though the factory was in ruins, and was held up 
as an example of excellent corporate citizenship.20  
5
15 William Beaver, Levi’s is leaving China – Levi Strauss, BUSINESS HORIZONS, March–April 1995, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1038/is_n2_v38/ai_16793712; see also http://www.democracynow.org/
1998/6/30/levi_strauss_returns_production_to_china.  Even while publicly traded, the company had followed a 
number of acclaimed social responsibility policies, including an openness toward unionization and plant closing 
notification policies that were more protective of employees’ interests than what the law required.  See CHARLES 
DERBER, CORPORATE NATION: HOW CORPORATIONS ARE TAKING OVER OUR LIVES AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT 
IT, at 188, 284 (St. Martin’s Press, 1998); see also Levi Strauss & Co. Global Sourcing and Operating Guidelines, 
reprinted in KARL SCHOENBERGER, LEVI’S CHILDREN: COMING TO TERMS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL 
MARKET PLACE  app. A, at 265 (Grove Press, 2000).  The argument for the LBO was, in part, that these efforts at 
social responsibility might become increasingly difficult if the company remained a public company and thus 
perhaps a target of hostile takeover attempts.
16 Timeline South Africa, BBC NEWS, Sept. 20, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/
1069402.stm.
17 How Levi's Trashed a Great American Brands, FORTUNE, Apr. 12, 1999, available at http://www.ninamunk.com/
documents/HowLevisTrashedaGreatAmericanBrand.htm.
18 Steve Wulf & Tom Witkowski, The Glow From a Fire, TIME, Jan. 8, 1996, available at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,983916,00.html.
19 Id.
20 David Lamb, Massachusetts Mill Town Gets Angel for Christmas, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1995, at A1.
 Feuerstein articulated his rationale in stakeholder-centric terms, saying:
I have a responsibility to the worker, both blue-collar and white-
collar. I have an equal responsibility to the community. It would 
have been unconscionable to put 3,000 people on the streets and 
deliver a deathblow to the cities of Lawrence and Methuen. Maybe 
on paper our company is worthless to Wall Street, but I can tell you 
it's worth more.21
  
Feuerstein became a minor celebrity for a time, sitting next to Hillary Clinton in the Senate 
gallery during former President Bill Clinton’s 1996 State of the Union address.22
 I have sometimes used Levi Strauss & Co. and Malden Mills in my own scholarship and 
lectures as examples of socially responsible companies.23  A common challenge to such examples 
is that such ethical, stakeholder-oriented behavior would be impossible for a public company.  
The notion implicit in this challenge is that privatization makes social responsibility more, not 
less, possible.  
 In fact, both the Levi’s and Malden Mills stories come with some limitations and 
important caveats, if offered as examples of successful corporate social responsibility.   Levi’s is 
regarded as a successful business, but it had a very tough decade in the 1990s.24  Malden Mills 
has traveled an even tougher road: it went through bankruptcy and has been purchased by 
6
21 BARBARA A. GLANZ, HANDLE WITH CARE: MOTIVATING AND RETAINING EMPLOYEES 251 (McGraw-Hill, 2002)
22 JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY, 198 (Yale University, 2000); see also 
Alison Mitchell, State of the Union: The Overview; Clinton Offers Challenge to Nation, Declaring, ‘Era of Big 
Government is Over’, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at A1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9D05E2DB1F39F937A15752C0A960958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. 
23 KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90–91 (2006) [hereinafter THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW].  
24 See Chris Reidy, In the Marketplace, They are no Longer Such a Great Fit, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23, 1999, at 
A1; see also Greg Johnson, Blue Period, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at D1, available at  http://articles.latimes.com/
1997/nov/06/business/fi-50688.  
another company.25  Feuerstein is no longer the principal owner or CEO.26  These companies 
attempted, with different degrees of success, to take into account the interests of stakeholders in 
an industry – the apparel business – that is extremely competitive and labor intensive.  They may 
or may not be the best examples of how companies can successfully take seriously the concerns 
of stakeholders.  But the fact that they tried to do so at all, especially in such a competitive 
industry, is a testament to the conventional wisdom that such efforts are more likely when 
companies are private and can insulate themselves in some respects from the vagaries of the 
capital markets.
 Undoubtedly, it is odd to assert two conventional wisdoms about a given subject — 
especially two that run at cross-purposes.  But both of these claims are prominent enough that 
they deserve to be called such.  Also, both conventional wisdoms have some merit, at least at the 
theoretical level.27   On the one hand, private companies are often seen as havens for corporate 
raiders who care little about the experiences of the businesses’ non-equity stakeholders, and 
public markets are seen as a way for the public to have influence on the decision-making of 
7
25 A Change at Malden Mills, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at C8, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9807E7D71F3FF933A25750C0A9659C8B63.
26 Id.
27 I should hasten to add that perhaps the existence of these two conflicting narratives can be best explained by a 
study of the history of privatization rather than the theory of it.   Both the Levi’s and the Malden Mills experiences 
can be explained in major part by a dedication of the Jewish owners to seeing the business as an extension of their 
own moral obligations.  See SINGER, supra note 22, at 200; SCHOENBERGER, supra note 15, at 36. The private nature 
of both firms gave them the freedom to act with less attention to the short-term concerns of the capital market.  But 
both companies struggled to keep their vision in place in part because of the difficulties posed by other markets, 
most prominently the product market.  The recent going private trend does not in any way seem motivated by social 
concerns.  Private equity firms are not as a rule dominated by families who want to use the companies they purchase 
to act out moral obligations, but by high net worth investors that see the purchased companies as mechanisms for 
building wealth, usually in a short time frame.  See, e.g., Michael Alles, Private Equity Funds: Champions of 
Governance and Disclosure?,4 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE, 217, 220 (2007) (“[P]rivate investors in 
private equity funds care only about making money”), available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jdg/journal/
v4/n4/full/2050068a.html. 
firms.  On the other hand, privatization may allow some companies the freedom from market 
pressures that make it more difficult to take a long-term, stakeholder view.  Let us look more 
carefully at these competing stories about privatization.
II. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE COMPANIES
 From the standpoint of non-shareholder stakeholders, there are key differences between 
public and private companies.  It is initially unclear, however, whether there is reason to believe 
that one form or the other is likely to lead to corporate governance that is more beneficial to all 
investors in the firm.  To find out, it is necessary to consider some major differences: time 
horizon, disclosure, concentration of equity ownership, and autonomy of management.
 A. TIME HORIZON
 Private companies are not limited by the short-term vision said to plague public 
markets.28  Share turnover in publicly-traded, Fortune 500 companies is very high—over 100% 
per year—and is even higher for smaller companies.29  Reporting requirements impose quarter-
by-quarter reporting, which requires companies to track the short term and encourages markets to 
reflect short-term interests.30  A recent study of chief financial officers revealed that a significant 
majority of them would voluntarily make decisions costly to the firm in the long-term in order to 
8
28 Mark Goyder, Ownership and Sustainability – Are Listed Companies More Responsible, ETHICAL CORPORATIONS, 
July 14, 2008, at 46–49.
29 LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY 277–78 
(Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2007).
30 Goyder, supra note 28, at 46–49
meet quarterly Wall Street projections.31  No one advocates for short-term management, but 
public markets make it more likely to occur.32  
 One example of short-term thinking that hurts employees is the so-called “7 percent 
rule,” which is the Wall Street notion that one way to achieve a short-term bump in stock price – 
usually the aforementioned 7% – is to announce lay-offs.33  Economic studies indicate that no 
such benefit continues over the long term.34  Nevertheless, the frequency of this short-term bump 
in stock prices has ensured that the “7% rule” is often a managerial heuristic.35  So if short-term 
management hurts stakeholders and long-term management benefits stakeholders, privatization 
may be a positive trend for stakeholders because it frees managers to manage with a longer time 
horizon and without the need for immediate accountability in the form of profits.
 On the other hand, managers of public companies are not totally driven toward short-term 
gains.  Managers of public companies often have a longer time horizon than shareholders, and 
the business judgment rule gives those managers sufficient leeway to manage with an eye toward 
at least the medium term.36  Privatization, in contrast, is often done in order to perform a quick-
flip of the target company, often within a year or two.37  When management takes such a short 
9
31 MITCHELL, supra note 30, at 277–78.
32 Goyder, supra note 28, at 46–49.
33 For a more in-depth description of the 7% rule, see Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded 
Age, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 12–13 (2008).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 13–14
37 See SEIU, BEHIND THE BUYOUTS: INSIDE THE WORLD OF PRIVATE EQUITY 14 (Apr. 2007); See generally Oesterle, 
supra note 5, (discussing the short term horizon of PE firms).
time horizon, stakeholders with a long-term horizon (e.g., employees, communities, and those 
concerned with the environment) tend to lose out.38  Perhaps the question of whether 
privatization is a good thing for non-equity stakeholders turns on an empirical judgment on the 
number of companies taken private only to be flipped.  According to the World Economic 
Forum, while leveraged buyouts using private funds are quicker to flip than those using public 
funds, only 12% of privately-funded LBOs go public or are re-sold within two years, and less 
than 3% do so within twelve months.39  At face value, this data supports the notion that 
privatization would not have a large impact on the time horizon of management, at least with 
regard to stakeholders. 
 When all is said and done, perhaps what can be said is that in private firms, it is more 
possible for managers to manage for the long term, even if not more likely.  To the extent that, in 
the long term, stakeholder interests and shareholder interests in fact coalesce,40 private 
companies may at least have more freedom to bring that coalescence about.  Moreover, if 
stakeholder-oriented firms allocate surplus differently, a longer time horizon might matter, 
because more time often allows reciprocal benefits of stakeholder management to accrue.41  For 
example, studies show that when employees believe their employers treat them fairly, employees 
10
38 See Oesterle, supra note 5. 
39 See Davis, supra note 11.
40 See Oesterle, supra note 5.
41 For a more robust analysis of reciprocal benefits in the workplace and in corporate governance, see THE FAILURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 23 at 158–85.  
are more loyal and obey company rules more.42  This reciprocity is a natural human reaction, and 
does not develop overnight.  So, when stakeholder governance creates good feelings on the part 
of employees and other stakeholders, a longer time horizon would allow the benefits gained from 
those good feelings to accrue. 
 This theory must include a handful of caveats.  First, to the extent that long-term interests 
of shareholders and other stakeholders do not necessarily coalesce, the lengthened time horizon 
will not be a significant benefit to privatization.  Second, the long term may be too far away to 
make such coalescence real.  As Keynes would say, in the long term we are all dead.43  If that is 
true, then perhaps what really matters is not long-term management, but the current allocation of 
corporate surplus (i.e., whether private companies will allocate less of the corporate surplus to 
equity and more to communities and employees).  While being a private company might make 
such an allocation more possible if equity and management want it to occur, there is nothing in 
the structure of the governance of private companies that makes it occur on its own accord.   
 B. DISCLOSURE  
 One of the oft-mentioned distinctions between private and public firms is the fact that 
private companies can go “dark” and can operate without disclosing certain kinds of information 
to the public.44  Information that can be hidden from the public can include specifics of executive 
11
42 For a more in-depth analysis of this effect within companies, see Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to 
Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 627–40 (2002).
43 JOHN M. KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923).
44 For an excellent analysis of the effects of privatization on disclosure, see Robert P. Bartlett, III, Going Private But 
Staying Public: Reexamining the Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms’ Going Private Transactions,  76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1088830.  
compensation, financial structure, and plans for the future.45  To the extent that stakeholders use 
the data in their labor negotiations, consumer purchasing habits, or shareholder activism to 
pressure companies to act differently, the loss of this information to the public is a key difference 
between public and private firms.  One might see the obligation of disclosure as one part of the 
implicit social contract between business and a democratic society.  That is, disclosure might be 
seen as a part of the set of requirements imposed by the polity on the corporate form in exchange 
for the power to aggregate wealth.46  To the extent that private firms are less subject to that 
democratic check, they may take into account the interests of the polity less often than public 
firms.
 There are several indications that these differences in disclosure do not have much of an 
impact on stakeholders.  First, according to Robert Bartlett, a significant and growing percentage 
of private companies voluntarily subject themselves to disclosure obligations, including those of 
Sarbanes-Oxley.47  Perhaps disclosure is a bonding mechanism for management to reassure 
investors, and even the public at large.48  In any event, privatization is increasingly done not to 
12
45 See Oesterle, supra note 5.
46 Andre Kah Hin Khor, Social Contract Theory, Legitimacy Theory and Corporate Social and Environmental 
Disclosure Policies: Constructing a Theoretical Framework, (unpublished essay, Nottingham Univ. Bus. Sch. 
available at http://www.ibe.org.uk/runner-up%20essay%20-%20undergrad%20category.pdf.
47 See Bartlett, supra note 44.
48 Irene Karamanou & George P. Nishiotis, Disclosure vs. Legal Bonding: Can Increased Disclosure Substitute for 
Cross-Listing?, at 4 (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.hec.unil.ch/urccf/seminar/IAS%20vs%20CL.pdf (citing 
research suggesting that bonding benefits are associated with increased disclosure); Richard Lambert, Christian 
Leuz & Robert E. Verrecchia, Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital, at 16 (Aug. 2006), 
available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/06/0620.pdf  (“As more public information is generated, the 
assessed variance of the firm’s cash flows goes down, and the discount of price relative to the expected cash flow 
declines”); see generally David Easley & Maureen O’Hara, Information and the Cost of Capital, 59 J. FINANCE 
1553, 1554–1583 (2004); Jeffrey Ng, The Effect of Information Quality on Liquidity Risk, (July 21, 2008), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097382
avoid financial disclosure but for other reasons.  Something other than disclosure obligations is 
driving companies to privatize.
 The second reason why differences in disclosure may nevertheless be immaterial to 
stakeholders is that typical financial disclosure provides only limited benefits to non-equity 
stakeholders.  Materiality to shareholders does not equal materiality to employees or other 
stakeholders, and the disclosure of financial data may reveal little of importance to those 
interests.  For example, financial disclosure may mean little to employees who worry about 
whether the company is going to relocate their particular factory overseas.  The decision may not 
be material to the typical shareholder, in that it would not have a reasonable likelihood of 
affecting the shareholder’s decision to buy or sell the stock, especially if the company is large 
and the factory relatively small in comparison to the company’s business as a whole.  But such a 
decision would be absolutely crucial to the employees who are employed in the factory.  So the 
requirement that companies disclose material financial information may simply be neither here 
nor there to most employees.  
 C. CONCENTRATION OF EQUITY OWNERSHIP 
 Private companies, by definition, have more concentrated equity ownership.49  To some 
degree, this concentration makes companies appear to be more like European companies, which 
are typically held less widely than U.S. companies.50  In Europe, blocks of shares are owned by 
13
49 See generally Oesterle, supra note 5, (referring to the requirement that a company that goes private has less than 
300 shareholders).
50 See THOMAS CLARKE & MARIE DELA RAMA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 9 (2008), available at 
http://www.ccg.uts.edu.au/PDF/fundamentals_of_cg.pdf. (“Though there are many widely held companies in 
Western Europe, an analysis of ownership structure … demonstrate[s] that ownership concentration is more 
extensive”).
banks or other institutions, and thus their shares are also typically less liquid than those of U.S. 
public firms.51  This correlates with a greater concern for non-equity stakeholders, which is much 
more of a mainstream idea in European managerial circles compared to the United States.52  This 
greater concern for stakeholders may spring from a more robust social contract between 
businesses and the European polity, or it may be derived from a greater identification between 
the equity holders and the companies, which in turn imposes reputational constraints on the 
behavior of the company that would not exist if the equity were held in a more diffuse way.  Or, 
it might spring from the fact that the lower liquidity means that the equity holders are more likely  
to be physically located in or near the facilities of the companies in question, so that the behavior 
of the companies in question are more likely to affect the equity holders themselves.  Moreover, 
this concern for employees in particular is woven into the fabric of corporate governance in 
Europe: the requirement that employees be represented on the company board, known as “co-
determination,” exists in 18 of the 25 European Union nations.53  
 The comparison between European publicly-traded companies and U.S. privately-held 
companies may therefore be helpful.  Lower liquidity and greater concentration of ownership 
lead to a greater identification between the holders of equity and the company itself.  It also may 
mean that the holders of the equity are more likely to be physically located near company 
14
51 See SGAM A.I. Starway Fd - Creation of Additional Incubator Fund Thomson Financial News CNF Regulatory 
News formerly Company News Feed September 2, 2008 Tuesday 4:30 PM GMT,
52 See Torsten Sewing, Governance: Germany - Driving Through Governance Reform, ETHICAL CORPORATIONS, 
Dec. 16, 2007, at 47; see also John Russell, Governance: F&C Investments - Governance Worth Investing In, 
ETHICAL CORPORATIONS, June 16, 2008 at 41–42; Goyder, supra note 28, at 46–49.
53 REBECCA PAGE, CO-DETERMINATION IN GERMANY – A BEGINNERS’ GUIDE 31 (2006).
facilities.  To the extent these parallels hold true – and it is an empirical question whether they do 
– one should not be surprised if it is indeed the case that private firms in the U.S. consider 
themselves freer than public companies to take into account the interests of stakeholders. 
 On the other hand, more concentrated equity ownership means that ownership is bound to 
be more idiosyncratic.  With concentrated equity ownership, such ownership can either be 
socially responsible like Aaron Feuerstein or be his morally bankrupt mirror image.  As 
compared to public market investors, private equity investors are as likely to be more profit-
oriented as less profit-oriented.54  According to Dale Osterle, private firms bear this out, and are 
more focused on the returns of equity ownership than are public firms.55
 There is a different side of the story.  Public markets, including capital markets, have all 
kinds of players in them.56  Not all players in the capital markets model themselves after 
gladiators; some shareholders use their equity ownership to advance other purposes and ideals.  
Shareholders include unions, public employee pension funds, church groups, and law professors.  
Shareholders can influence the market, and can engage in shareholder activism on anything from 
the use of napalm to force-feeding geese.57
15
54 See Donald Jay Korn, Working the Private Equity Circuit, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Nov. 1, 1998, http://
www.allbusiness.com/business-finance/equity-funding-private-equity/707232-1.html. (Generally “private equity 
investors are extremely profit-oriented, there are exceptions -- especially local groups that have alternative goals”).
55 See Oesterle, supra note 5.
56 See CTR. FOR CAPITAL FLOW ANALYSIS, CAPITAL MARKET PLAYERS: INVESTORS, ISSUERS, AND INTERMEDIARIES, 
available at http://www.capital-flow-analysis.com/market-sectors/market-players.html.
57 See Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F.Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985) (shareholder sued company to include 
shareholder’s proposal regarding force-feeding geese for production of foie gras); Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. 
S.E.C., 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (SEC did not require Dow Chemical to include a shareholder proposal to limit Dow’s 
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 Separation of ownership and control may counterbalance the restraints of the public 
market, however.  With public companies, the “separation of ownership and control” means that 
equity holders may not identify with, or be identified with, the activities of the companies whose 
stock they own.58  There is thus a loss of reputational constraint on the behavior of public 
firms.59  It is possible that, with private companies, they will be identified with their dominant 
equity investors simply by reputation.  For example, the fact that the Haas family saw Levi 
Strauss & Co. as their company meant that they projected their family values onto the company 
culture, to the benefit of the company’s stakeholders.60
 One other effect of concentrated equity ownership deserves mention.  As equity 
ownership becomes more concentrated, it is typical for companies to rely on debt rather than 
equity financing, which leads to a higher debt-to-equity ratio.61  This higher leverage may have 
effects on non-shareholder stakeholders.  It is a financial truism that leverage leads to greater 
volatility in return on equity.62  To the extent that such volatility leads to riskier decisions on the 
part of management (because equity holders enjoy a disproportionate benefit from risky 
decisions that pay off, and their downside risk is limited because of limited liability), high 
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61 See Güner Gürsoy and Kürşat Aydoğan, Equity Ownership Structure, Risk-Taking and Performance: An Empirical 
Investigation in Turkish Companies, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, (1998), available at http://
www.bilkent.edu.tr/~aydogan/OwnershipStructure.pdf.
62 Frederic L. Pryor, Economic Evolution and Structure, Cambridge University Press, 1996 at page 110 available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=OPvCsPjeJ68C&pg=PA110&lpg=PA110&dq=leverage+leads+to+greater+volati 
volatility&source=web&ots=w1AGVKSOX-
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leverage will be a negative for those stakeholders that value stability rather than risk.63  In other 
words, to the extent private firms are highly leveraged, they will have greater incentives to make 
riskier decisions with the possibility of high payoffs.64  This will be especially true if the equity 
of the specific private company is held in a private equity firm that has a number of such 
companies in a diversified portfolio, because the risk is hedged.65  From the standpoint of the 
private equity firm, the risk of any particular company failing because of its risky decisions is 
more than made up for by the potential upside to equity in the other companies.66  From the 
standpoint of the stakeholders of the individual firms, who are not able to diversify away the 
downside risk of their company’s failure, the riskier decisions brought about by high leverage are 
a worry.67
 D. AUTONOMY OF MANAGEMENT
 If management is more autonomous, it is possible for managers to use their autonomy to 
allocate more of the corporate surplus to employees and other stakeholders.68  Discretion can 
mean that more of the corporate surplus goes to employees and other stakeholders, because 
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67 For a related point, see generally Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008), for a discussion of the divergent interests of  non-shareholder stakeholders and shareholders 
with regards to how leveraged a company should be.
68 See Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121 (1991); Frank J. Garcia, Note, 
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managers can use their own sense of fairness and “just dessert” as a guide in allocating the 
accumulated corporate surplus and can be freed from a strict fiduciary obligation to maximize 
returns to shareholders.69  This was the ostensible argument behind the stakeholder statutes 
adopted during the 1980s: by giving more autonomy to managers, non-equity stakeholders would 
benefit.70  Some research bolsters the argument that this effect has been one of the by-products of 
those stakeholder statutes.71    
 With regard to the public/private company debate, one would assume that management is 
less autonomous in a public company because the company faces capital market discipline72 and 
the managers occasionally face legal discipline if they do not pay close attention to the well-
being of shareholders.73  In private companies, there is less capital market pressure and thus the 
potential for more managerial autonomy.74  And assuming the benevolence of private company 
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management, this autonomy will give it more flexibility to allocate a greater portion of the 
corporate surplus to non-equity stakeholders.  
 But this does not ring true with the current privatization trends.  Private equity firms do 
not appear to follow in the Aaron Feuerstein or Haas family models.  As Dale Osterle has 
written, private equity firms today are even more oriented toward the prerogatives of equity than 
are public firms.75  If this is right, then the autonomy of private-firm management might be used 
not for the benefit of stakeholders, but for the benefit of the managers themselves and their 
cohort of equity owners.  
 Moreover, the notion that managers have more autonomy in private firms may simply be 
incorrect.  Owners of private-company equity may be more involved and engaged in the 
management of private firms.76  They may not take too kindly to management allocating 
corporate wealth they believe is theirs to other stakeholders.  Ironically, management of public 
firms may be better able to use their own moral sensibilities as a guide than the management of 
private firms.  The equity of public companies is typically held by gross aggregations of 
shareholders, and shareholders have difficulty coordinating their monitoring efforts.77  
Management is therefore insulated from oversight because of agency costs.78  Concentrated 
ownership, more of the norm in private companies, makes it easier for shareholders to monitor 
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management and more difficult for management to “go off the reservation” and act in ways that 
benefit stakeholders at the expense of shareholders.79  
III. CONCLUSION
 Obviously, this discussion is merely a first cut at the various ways in which private 
companies may be better or worse for stakeholders than public companies.  There certainly are 
other material characteristics of private firms that I have not identified here.  But given this first 
view, it does not appear that privatization is necessarily positive or negative for stakeholders.  
There may be somewhat more freedom for private firms to operate with a view toward 
stakeholder interests, but the impact is likely to be marginal.  And that freedom could cut the 
other way, giving private firms the ability to insulate themselves from stakeholder interests and 
public oversight, making them even more profit-oriented and less concerned about the public 
interest.
 To protect stakeholders, assistance should come from legal reforms such as adjustments 
in fiduciary duty requirements and the makeup of corporations’ decision-making bodies.  These 
reforms should be applied to both publicly-traded and privately-financed firms.  The benefits to 
stakeholders arising organically from privatization, if they exist at all, are likely to be marginal.  
If we are convinced that stakeholders deserve some additional protection, then we should look 
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outside of corporate governance or seek to weave a concern for their interests into the very fabric 
of the firm itself.80  
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